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Abstract
Many observers have voiced concerns that standards create essen-
tiality and thus monopoly power for the holders of standard essential
patents (SEPs). To address these concerns, Lerner and Tirole (2015)
advocate structured price commitments, whereby SEP holders commit
to the maximum royalty they would charge were their technology in-
cluded in the standard. We consider a setting in which a technology
implementer holds private information about demand. In this setting,
price commitments increase efficiency not only by curbing SEP hold-
ers’ market power, but also by alleviating distortions in the design
of the royalty scheme. In the absence of price commitments, the SEP
holder distorts the implementer’s output downward in the low-demand
state to reduce the high-demand type’s information rent. Price com-
mitments reduce this distortion.
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1 Introduction
Many observers have voiced concerns that standards create essentiality and
thus monopoly power for the holders of standard essential patents (SEPs)
(Farrell et al., 2007; Ganglmair et al., 2012; Dewatripont and Legros, 2013;
Lerner and Tirole, 2015). This is said to cause at least two inefficiencies.
First, SEP holders can charge higher royalties than under hypothetical ex
ante licensing. Second, anticipating such opportunistic behavior, standard
setting organizations (SSOs) may select technologically inferior function-
alities that are available at lower royalties, for example because there is
within-functionality competition or the patents have expired.
To address these concerns, Lerner and Tirole (2015) advocate struc-
tured price commitments, whereby SEP holders commit to the maximum
royalty they would charge were their technology included in the standard.1
In Lerner and Tirole’s complete-information setting, price commitments re-
store the competitive benchmark royalty rates and ensure that the SSO
selects the efficient standard. In practice, however, there is often consid-
erable uncertainty about the benefits of including certain functionalities in
the standard. In the case of mobile telephony, for instance, it may not
be clear how much consumers are willing to pay for increased transmission
speeds. Such uncertainty is typically resolved only after the standard has
been set. Moreover, technology contributors (SEP holders) tend to be less
well informed about demand parameters than implementers of the standard
(in the mobile telephony example, the handset makers).
In this paper, we investigate the effects of the kind of price commitments
advocated by Lerner and Tirole (2015) in an environment with asymmetric
information between upstream and downstream firms. We consider a setting
in which the downstream firm holds private information about the demand
for the final product incorporating the standard. In such a setting, the
upstream firm will design its royalty scheme to screen the downstream firm
1In a similar vein, Llanes and Poblete (2014) study alternative standard-setting and
patent pool-formation rules and show that welfare is maximized by ex ante agreements
about participation in, and the distribution of dividends from, a patent pool for technolo-
gies selected into the standard.
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and elicit its private information (Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 1991).2
We assume that the uncertainty about demand is resolved after the SSO
sets the standard but before royalty negotiations between upstream and
downstream firm take place.
In the absence of price commitments, the upstream firm screens the
downstream firm by means of a non-linear royalty scheme. As usual, the
optimal contract involves no distortion of the downstream firm’s output in
the high-demand state. In the low-demand state, output is distorted down-
ward to make it less attractive for the high type to mimic the low type. This
is done in an effort to reduce the downstream firm’s information rent. Ex-
cept for the information rent, the optimal contract extracts the downstream
firm’s entire surplus. Even though an alternative, albeit inferior, technology
is available ex ante, once the standard is set the downstream firm can no
longer turn to this alternative technology if it wants to comply with the stan-
dard. Because the SSO anticipates the upstream firm’s behavior, it often
selects the inferior alternative technology as the standard. This is especially
bad for welfare if the high-demand state is very likely; that is, of the new
technology is very promising.
In the presence of price commitments, the upstream firm can indirectly
control the contract that it will offer to the downstream firm after the stan-
dard is set by appropriately choosing the royalty cap to which it commits
prior to standardization. Essentially, thus, the need to ensure inclusion in
the standard adds an additional constraint to the upstream firm’s problem.
This forces the upstream firm to leave enough rent to the downstream firm
to beat out the alternative technology. We show that a side-effect of this
imperative to improve on the alternative technology is to reduce – or even
completely eliminate – the distortion of the low type’s output. Intuitively,
because the upstream firm cannot extract the downstream firm’s entire sur-
plus anymore, there is less of a need to reduce the information rent; on the
contrary, giving an information rent is an efficient way of transferring some
surplus to the downstream firm.
2Gallini and Wright (1990) address similar issues in a setting where the innovator,
rather than the implementer, holds private information, so that there is signaling rather
than screening.
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The paper is related to the growing literature on the economics of stan-
dard setting. Within that literature, Llanes and Poblete (2014) and Lerner
and Tirole (2015) share our focus on ex ante commitments. Llanes (forth-
coming) studies a game of repeated standard setting and shows that com-
mitments to license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND)
terms can outperform price commitments when technologies are hard to de-
scribe ex ante. Bekkers et al. (2017) model the disclosure process and show
that, when there is competition for inclusion in the standard, vertically in-
tegrated firms can find it optimal to commit to royalty-free licensing.
For the most part, the literature has ignored asymmetric information
about the benefits and costs of technologies vying for inclusion in a standard,
which is the focus of our paper. Two exceptions – though different in focus
from our paper – are Farrell and Simcoe (2012) and Lerner et al. (2016).
Farrell and Simcoe (2012) model standard setting as a war of attrition where
selection occurs through delay. Lerner et al. (2016) study SEP holders’
decision whether to make generic or specific disclosures to the SSO. Both
papers assume that the quality of technologies, or the patents that cover
them, is innovators’ private information. By contrast, in our model it is
the implementer that holds private information about the demand for a
technology.
Our paper also differs from much of the rest of the literature by consid-
ering non-linear royalties. Like us, Schmidt (2014) allows for two-part tariffs
and shows that, in the context of licensing complementary technologies, they
eliminate royalty stacking. In our paper, royalties can be part of the optimal
contract despite the fact that we allow for two-part tariffs because they are
used for screening purposes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out
the model. Section 3 analyzes the case without price commitments, while
Section 4 turns to the case in which price commitments, in the form of a
royalty cap, are possible. Section 5 concludes.
4
2 Model
Consider the following setup. There is a single upstream firm U , a single
downstream firm D, and an SSO. U owns a patent on a feature that the SSO
considers for inclusion in a standard. There exists an alternative (backstop)
technology that is available royalty free and generates a known (inverse) de-
mand P0(q). The demand generated by U ’s technology is uncertain and gov-
erned by a demand parameter θ ∈ {H,L}, such that PH(q) > PL(q) > P0(q).
The demand parameter is initially unknown to all parties but is revealed to
D prior to the implementation of the standard (in a final product). Assume
Pr(θ = L) = λ and Pr(θ = H) = 1− λ. D has production costs C(q).
The timing is as follows:
1. In the presence of price commitments, U announces the maximum
royalty it will charge R̄(q).
2. The SSO selects between U ’s technology and the alternative one. As-
sume the SSO is “user-driven” and thus selects the technology that
maximizes D’s expected profit.
3. If U ’s technology is selected, D learns θ. Otherwise, D produces using
the backstop technology and earns maxq P0(q)q − C(q).
4. U proposes a royalty scheme R(q). If a price commitment is in place,
U is subject to the constraint R(q) ≤ R̄(q).
5. D accepts or rejects. If it accepts, it chooses its output q to maximize
Pθ(q)q − C(q)−R(q).
Let π0(q) ≡ P0(q)q − C(q) denote the downstream firm’s profit with
the alternative technology. Similarly, let πθ(q) ≡ Pθ(q)q − C(q) denote the
downstream firm’s profit gross of royalties with U ’s technology when the
demand parameter is θ = L,H. We assume that the profit function is twice
continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and has a unique maximum for
any demand realization. We let q∗θ denote the profit-maximizing output
when the demand parameter is θ. In addition, we impose the following
assumption:
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Assumption 1. π′H(q) > π
′
L(q) for all q ≥ 0.
This assumption says that the change in profit resulting from a marginal
expansion of output is larger in the high-demand than in the low-demand
state.
To streamline the analysis, we will also assume the following:
Assumption 2. π′L(0) > (1− λ)π′H(0).
This assumption ensures that the optimal contract will not involve shut-
down of the low type. For λ close enough to zero it is violated because of
Assumption 1. In that case, U ignores the L type and leaves the H type no
rents. As a result U ’s technology is always rejected by the SSO in favor of
the backstop technology. Price commitments can clearly improve the out-
come in such a situation which happens if the technology is very promising
(high-demand state is likely).3
3 No price commitments
Consider first the case without price commitments. We solve the model
backwards, starting from stage 4.
Royalty setting stage. Suppose that the SSO has selected U ’s technol-
ogy as the standard, so that D cannot use the alternative technology. U ’s
problem of choosing a royalty scheme can be recast as choosing the quantities
qL and qH and associated royalty payments RL and RH to solve
max
qL,qH ,RL,RH
λRL + (1− λ)RH (1)
subject to individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) con-
straints,
πL(qL)−RL ≥ 0 (2)
πH(qH)−RH ≥ 0 (3)
πL(qL)−RL ≥ πL(qH)−RH (4)
πH(qH)−RH ≥ πH(qL)−RL. (5)
3Note that although price commitments will be efficiency-enhancing ex ante, they may
nevertheless result in ex post inefficiency in the case where the low type is shut down.
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The following proposition characterizes the solution to U ’s problem.
Proposition 1. In the absence of price commitments, U chooses the royalty
scheme to implement an allocation (qNCL , q
NC




H ) = 0 and
π′L(q
NC
L ) = (1 − λ)π′H(qNCL ) > 0, with associated royalty payments RNCL =
πL(q
NC




H )− [πH(qNCL )− πL(qNCL )].
Proof. We will solve a relaxed problem, ignoring the high type’s IR con-
straint, (3), and the low type’s IC constraint, (4), and then show that the
solution to the relaxed problem satisfies these constraints, so that it is also
the solution to the original problem. Since the objective is increasing in RL
and RH , the constraints (2) and (5) must be binding at the optimum. Hence




λπL(qL) + (1− λ)[πH(qH)− πH(qL) + πL(qL)],
leading to the first-order conditions
π′H(qH) = 0 (6)
π′L(qL) = (1− λ)π′H(qL). (7)
The existence of a strictly positive solution to (7) follows from Assumptions
1 and 2 together with the assumption that πL and πH are continuously
differentiable and have unique maximizers.
Next, we show that π′H(qL) > 0, a sufficient condition for which, by strict
concavity of πθ and (6), is qL < qH . Suppose otherwise, i.e., qL ≥ qH . Then
π′H(qL) ≤ 0 and hence π′L(qL) = (1− λ)π′H(qL) ≥ π′H(qL), contradicting the
assumption that π′H(q) > π
′
L(q).
It remains to verify that the constraints that we initially ignored are
indeed satisfied. Start from (5):
πH(qH)−RH ≥ πH(qL)−RL ≥ πL(qL)−RL ≥ 0
where the second inequality follows from πH(qL) ≥ πL(qL) (which is implied
by the assumption that PH(q) ≥ PL(q) for all q) and the last inequality from
(2). Hence, (3) is satisfied.
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To check (4), note that the left hand side equals 0. Hence, we have
πL(qH)−RH ≤ 0
which, using (5) and (2), can be written as







which holds for qH > qL by Assumption 1.
The allocation in Proposition 1 features the familiar “no distortion at the
top” result – the high type produces the efficient output – and a downward
distortion of the low type’s output, i.e., the low type produces less than
the efficient quantity (characterized by π′L(qL) = 0).
4 The intuition is that
U can extract D’s surplus through the royalty scheme R(q), and thus has
an interest in inducing the profit-maximizing output level. The presence
of private information, however, allows D to collect an information rent
in the high-demand state. To reduce this information rent, U lowers the
output level in the low-demand state below the efficient level. This makes it
less attractive for the high type to mimic the low type, and thus generates a
first-order gain in terms of reducing the information rent in the high-demand
state, while (initially) causing only second-order losses in the low-demand
state.
The allocation can be implemented by means of a royalty scheme such
that R′(qNCH ) = 0 and R(q
NC
H ) = πH(q
NC
H ) − πH(qNCL ) + πL(qNCL ) while
R′(qNCL ) = (1− λ)π′H(qNCL ) and R(qNCL ) = πL(qNCL ). An example of such a
royalty scheme is a menu of two-part tariffs consisting of a fixed fee F and
a per-unit royalty r, where (FL, rL) = (πL(q
NC
L )− rLqNCL , (1− λ)π′H(qNCL ))
and (FH , rH) = (πH(q
NC
H ) − πH(qNCL ) + πL(qNCL ), 0). In words, the high
type receives a contract that includes only a fixed fee, while the low type
receives a contract that includes both a fixed fee and a per-unit royalty.
Standard setting stage. Anticipating the outcome at the royalty-setting
stage, the SSO selects U ’s technology if and only if it yields D a greater
4The term ‘efficiency’ here refers to the joint profits of U and D, ignoring consumers.
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the condition for the SSO to select U ’s technology is
λ[πL(q
NC
L )−RNCL ] + (1− λ)[πH(qNCH )−RNCH ] ≥ π̂0,
or
(1− λ)[πH(qNCL )− πL(qNCL )] ≥ π̂0. (8)
As noted after Assumption 2, for λ close to 0, the SSO rejects U ’s technology
and D works with the 0-technology. Similarly, if λ is close to 1, the L-state
with no rents for D is so likely that D’s expected profit does not exceed π̂0.
Thus also in this case, U ’s technology is rejected. Consequently, only for
intermediate values of λ will the SSO choose to work with U ’s technology.
There are two inefficiencies that arise in this setting. First, although
U ’s technology is always superior to the alternative one, it will sometimes
not be selected by the SSO. This inefficiency is due to U ’s lack of commit-
ment power: because royalties are negotiated after the standard is set, U
cannot credibly promise not to extract (most of) D’s surplus after being
selected as the standard.5 Second, the contract designed by the upstream
firm introduces an output distortion in the low-demand state. This second
inefficiency exacerbates the first one, as it reduces the range of parameters
for which the SSO adopts U ’s superior technology compared to a situation
without output distortions.
5Note that a joint profit maximizing SSO would always adopt U ’s technology. The
joint profit maximizing adoption rule (taking qL and qH as given) would be to select U ’s
technology if and only if
λπL(qL) + (1 − λ)πH(qH) ≥ π̂0. (9)
To see that it is always joint-profit maximizing to adopt U ’s technology, notice first that
since PL(q) > P0(q), we have πL(q
∗
L) > π̂0. U could propose a unique contract (q,R) =
(q∗L, πL(q
∗
L)), which both types would accept. By revealed preference, if U instead proposes
the contracts (qNCL , R
NC




H ) characterized in Proposition 1, it must be that
this yields a higher profit:
λπL(q
NC
L ) + (1 − λ)[πH(qNCH ) − πH(qNCL ) + πL(qNCL )] ≥ πL(q∗L),
which, together with πL(q
∗
L) > π̂0, implies (9). A similar argument can be made for the
case where it is optimal to shut down the low type.
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4 Price commitments
We now turn to the case where the upstream firm can make price commit-
ments at stage 1. In a first step, we will ignore the royalty setting stage and
assume that U can implement any allocation it would like to through the
cap R̄(q). Later we show that the allocation U wants to achieve can indeed
be implemented through an appropriately chosen cap.
4.1 The optimal allocation
Standard setting stage. Let (q̄L, q̄H , R̄L, R̄H) denote the allocation that
the SSO anticipates will be implemented at the royalty setting stage if U is
selected as the standard. The SSO selects U ’s technology if and only if
λ[πL(q̄L)− R̄L] + (1− λ)[πH(q̄H)− R̄H ] ≥ π̂0.




λR̄L + (1− λ)R̄H
subject to
λ[πL(q̄L)− R̄L] + (1− λ)[πH(q̄H)− R̄H ] ≥ π̂0 (10)
πL(q̄L)− R̄L ≥ 0 (11)
πH(q̄H)− R̄H ≥ 0 (12)
πL(q̄L)− R̄L ≥ πL(q̄H)− R̄H (13)
πH(q̄H)− R̄H ≥ πH(q̄L)− R̄L. (14)
Here, (10) is the constraint imposed by the SSO’s selection rule.
Proposition 2. Suppose π̂0 > (1 − λ)[πH(qNCL ) − πL(qNCL )]. Then, U im-





H) = 0, and
(ii) either π′L(q̄
C
L ) = 0 or πH(q̄
C
L )− πL(q̄CL ) = π̂0/(1− λ).
Proof. The assumption that π̂0 > (1− λ)[πH(qL)− πL(qL)] implies that the
royalty scheme chosen in the absence of price commitments does not permit
10
U to be selected as the standard, and hence that (10) must be binding. Since
(14) and (11), together with πH(q) > πL(q), imply that (12) must be slack,
the Lagrangian of the problem can be written, using the binding constraint
(10) to replace R̄L, as
L = λπL(q̄L)+(1−λ)πH(q̄H)−π̂0−η
[















where γ, µ, and η are the multipliers associated with constraints (11), (13),
and (14), respectively. Differentiating (15) with respect to q̄L, q̄H , and R̄H ,
respectively, yields the first-order conditions
π′L(q̄L)(λ+ η)− ηπ′H(q̄L) = 0 (16)
π′H(q̄H)
λ
[(1− λ)(λ− γ − µ) + η]− µπ′L(q̄H) = 0 (17)
1
λ
[(1− λ)γ + µ− η] = 0. (18)
From (18), we obtain
(1− λ)γ = η − µ. (19)
We now show that (13) and (14) cannot simultaneously be binding, so that
either µ = 0 or η = 0. Suppose, by contradiction, that both (13) and (14)
hold with equality. Solving both equations for R̄H − R̄L then implies
πL(q̄H)− πL(q̄L) = πH(q̄H)− πH(q̄L). (20)





Assumption 1 rules out (20) for any q̄L 6= q̄H . (Having q̄L = q̄H is clearly
suboptimal for U .)
Thus, either µ = 0 or η = 0, which leaves only two possibilities that are
compatible with (19):
(a) µ = 0, (1 − λ)γ = η > 0: that is, (13) is slack while (11) and (14) are
binding;
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(b) because η = 0 is not compatible with µ > 0, we have γ = µ = η = 0:
that is, (13), (11), and (14) are all slack.
In case (a), we have R̄L = πL(q̄L) and R̄H = πH(q̄H) − (πH(q̄L) − πL(q̄L)).
Then, by (10),
(1− λ)[πH(q̄L)− πL(q̄L)] = π̂0,
which pins down q̄CL . Solving
max
q̄H
λπL(q̄L) + (1− λ)[πH(q̄H)− (πH(q̄L)− πL(q̄L))]
yields π′H(q̄H) = 0. In case (b), the first-order conditions (16) and (17)
imply π′L(q̄L) = π
′
H(q̄H) = 0.
By assuming that π̂0 > (1 − λ)[πH(qNCL ) − πL(qNCL )], Proposition 2 fo-
cuses on the case where, in the absence of price commitments, U ’s technology
would not be selected as the standard. Price commitments allow U to credi-
bly promise lower royalties and thereby ensure the selection of its technology.
As U ’s technology is superior to the backstop, this increases efficiency.6
The proposition also shows that, while the quantity in the high-demand
state is unaffected and continues to be set at the efficient level (q̄CH = q
NC
H =
q∗H), the quantity in the low-demand state is set differently than in the
absence of price commitments. The following corollary spells out how.
Corollary. Price commitments reduce the output distortion in the low-
demand state: q̄CL > q
NC
L .
The result is trivial in the case where q̄CL = q
∗
L. The more interesting case
is when q̄CL solves (1− λ)[πH(q̄CL )− πL(q̄CL )] = π̂0. In that case, the result in
the corollary follows from the fact that, by assumption, (1− λ)[πH(qNCL )−
πL(q
NC
L )] < π̂0, and that πH(q) − πL(q) is strictly increasing in q due to
Assumption 1.
Thus, price commitments alleviate the output distortions caused by in-
formation asymmetries. The intuition for this result is that the imperative to
ensure selection by the SSO forces U to leave rents to D. As a result, U has
less of an incentive to lower the high type’s information rent by distorting
the low type’s output.
6See footnote 5 for a formal argument showing that a joint-profit maximizing SSO
would always adopt U even in the absence of price commitments.
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4.2 Implementing the allocation through the royalty cap
We now show that U can implement the allocation derived in Proposition
2 by means of an appropriately chosen royalty cap R̄(q). At the royalty
setting stage (stage 4), the upstream firm’s problem can be written as
max
qL,qH ,RL,RH
λRL + (1− λ)RH (21)
subject to the following constraints:
RL ≤ R̄(qL) (22)
RH ≤ R̄(qH) (23)
πL(qL)−RL ≥ 0 (24)
πH(qH)−RH ≥ 0 (25)
πL(qL)−RL ≥ πL(qH)−RH (26)
πH(qH)−RH ≥ πH(qL)−RL. (27)
Without loss of generality, we will assume in what follows that R̄(q) is al-
most everywhere differentiable. The following lemma shows how the optimal
allocation can be implemented.
Lemma 1. The allocation (q̄L, q̄H) can be implemented by choosing R̄(q)








λR̄(qL) + (1− λ)πH(qH),
the first-order conditions of which are
R̄′(qL) = 0
π′H(qH) = 0.








If instead (27) is binding, U solves
max
qL,qH
λR̄(qL) + (1− λ)[πH(qH)− πH(qL) + R̄(qL)],
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the first-order conditions of which are
R̄′(qL) = (1− λ)π′H(qL)
π′H(qH) = 0.
Thus, designing R̄′ such that R̄′(q̄CL ) = (1 − λ)π′H(q̄CL ) leads U to choose
qL = q̄
C





By appropriately choosing R̄(q) at stage 1, the upstream firm can indi-
rectly control the quantity qL that it will implement at stage 4, while qH
will be set at the profit-maximizing level.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of price commitments in the standard-setting
process when there is asymmetric information between upstream and down-
stream firms. Specifically, we assume that the downstream firm is privately
informed about the demand for the upstream firm’s technology. In the ab-
sence of price commitments, the upstream firm designs its royalty scheme to
elicit the downstream firm’s private information. To reduce the downstream
firm’s information rent, the upstream firm distorts output away from the
efficient level in the low-demand state. Moreover, because royalties are ne-
gotiated after the standard has been set, the upstream firm cannot commit
to leave the downstream firm better off than with an inferior alternative
technology that is available royalty free. Anticipating this opportunistic be-
havior, a user-friendly SSO often refrains from selecting the upstream firm’s
technology despite its technological superiority.
Price commitments allow the upstream firm to commit not to behave
opportunistically after being selected as the standard. An interesting side-
effect of this is that it curbs the incentive for the upstream firm to distort
the downstream firm’s output. In fact, convincing the SSO to select the up-
stream firm’s technology requires leaving enough surplus to the downstream
firm, and giving information rents to the high type is a relatively cheap way
of doing so. As a result, price commitments reduce output distortions and
ensure that the superior technology is selected as the standard.
14
References
Bekkers, R., Catalini, C., Martinelli, A., Righi, C., Simcoe, T. (2017): Dis-
closure Rules and Declared Essential Patents. NBER Working Paper No.
23627.
Dewatripont, M., Legros, P. (2013): ‘Essential’ Patents, FRAND Royal-
ties and Technological Standards. Journal of Industrial Economics 61(4):
913–937.
Farrell, J., Hayes, J., Shapiro, C., Sullivan, T. (2007): Standard Setting,
Patents, and Hold-up. Antitrust Law Journal 74(3): 603–670.
Farrell, J., Simcoe, T. (2012): Choosing the Rules for Consensus Standard-
ization. RAND Journal of Economics 43(2): 235–252.
Gallini, N.T., Wright, B.D. (1990): Technology Transfer Under Asymmetric
Information. RAND Journal of Economics 21(1): 147–160.
Ganglmair, B., Froeb, L.M., Werden, G.J. (2012): Patent Hold-Up and An-
titrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation. Journal
of Industrial Economics 60(2): 249–273.
Lerner, J., Tabakovic, H., Tirole, J. (2016): Patent Disclosures and
Standard-Setting. NBER Working Paper No. 22768.
Lerner, J., Tirole, J. (2015): Standard-Essential Patents. Journal of Political
Economy 123(3): 547–586.
Llanes, G. (forthcoming): Ex-ante Agreements and FRAND Commitments
in a Repeated Game of Standard-Setting Organizations. Review of Indus-
trial Organization .
Llanes, G., Poblete, J. (2014): Ex Ante Agreements in Standard Setting and
Patent-Pool Formation. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
23(1): 50–67.
Macho-Stadler, I., Perez-Castrillo, D. (1991): Contrats de licences et
asymétrie d’information. Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 24: 189–
208.
15
Schmidt, K.M. (2014): Complementary Patents and Market Structure.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 23(1): 68–88.
16
